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Mats Bergman* 
Gabriele Gava, Peirce’s Account of Purposefulness: A Kantian Perspective, London 
and New York: Routledge, 2014, 224 p.
In Peirce’s Account of Purposefulness, Gabriele Gava tackles one of the thorniest 
questions in Peirce research, namely the problem of Peirce’s relationship to Kantian 
philosophy. The leading argument of the book amounts to what may be the most 
sustained defence of a transcendental reading of Peirce’s thought since Karl-Otto 
Apel’s pioneering efforts. In pursuing this path, Gava is not exactly moving through 
uncharted terrain; but nor has he chosen the road most travelled in recent times. 
For this reason alone, Gava’s nuanced re-evaluation of the role of transcendental 
method in Peirce’s philosophy ought to be welcomed; for as Gava observes, neither 
the proponents nor the critics of the transcendental interpretation of Peirce have paid 
sufficient attention to what “transcendental” means or may entail in this context. 
This is not to say that the contribution of Peirce’s Account of Purposefulness 
would be limited to the explication of the transcendental element in Peirce’s thought. 
The book includes insightful discussions of Peirce’s classification of the sciences, 
methodeutic, evolutionary metaphysics, pragmatism, and critical common-sensism, 
among many other key topics in Peirce research. These are valuable in their own right, 
whether the reader is convinced by Gava’s overarching Kantian interpretation or not. 
While clearly committed to his cause, the author succeeds in providing a balanced 
account of its main topics, taking note of possible counter-arguments as well as of the 
broader implications of the positions being defended and criticised.
The book is divided into six substantial Chapters: “The Architectonic and 
the Fundamental Elements of Thought and Sign Processes”, “Methodeutic and 
Speculative Rhetoric”, “How Are Synthetical Judgments Possible?”, “Teleology in 
Peirce’s Evolutionary Metaphysics”, “Peirce and Transcendental Philosophy”, and 
“Pragmatism and Common Sense”. This may suggest a fairly standard approach 
to the interpretation of Peirce’s philosophy, starting from the top-level categories 
and working its way toward metaphysics, pragmatism, and common sense at the 
bottom. However, the central arguments hinge on the pragmatic character of Peirce’s 
(purported) transcendental method, and its connection to the purposefulness of 
interpretation, which Gava primarily articulates in terms of Peircean speculative 
rhetoric and methodeutic. While this does not entail a full-scale overturning of 
architectonic hierarchies, the proposed reassessment of the systemic roles of the 
lower normative sciences is arguably one of the main yields of Gava’s undertaking. 
Therefore, after a brief overview of Gava’s interpretative strategy and its central 
transcendental argument, I will focus my comments – both positive and critical – 
on how these play out in his explication of the functions of Peirce’s philosophical 
disciplines. 
From the point of view of recent debates concerning the evolution of Peirce’s 
philosophy, it is interesting to note that Gava on the one hand seems to accept a 
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broadly developmental reading (following in the footsteps of Murray Murphey and 
T.  L. Short), while he on the other hand wishes to preserve a special architectonic 
role for the seminal early article “On a New List of Categories”. It is not so much 
the actual results of this contested text – the foundational tract for many of those 
interpreters who argue for a deep and lasting unity in Peirce’s thought – as it is the 
method of prescision formulated therein that grounds Gava’s reading of Peirce. On 
this basis, Gava (12, 17) presents his own account of the major forms of dependency 
underpinning Peirce’s system, distinguishing logical prescindability from factual 
dependence and logical reducibility. Significantly, logical dependence refers to the 
possibility of abstracting a simpler conception from a more complex one so that the 
former can thereafter be referenced without necessarily considering the latter, while 
factual necessity entails the need to make reference to a more complex conception 
when introducing a simpler one. 
Gava’s central argument is that Peirce’s method of prescision can be construed as 
a kind of non-justificatory transcendental inquiry (153). Its task is to abstract those 
formal elements that thought itself cannot prescind from. Yet, Peirce’s transcendental 
approach is not to be understood as a reply to sceptical challenges, but as something 
that sets out from an acceptance of human knowledge as developed in human 
practices or sciences. Thus, Peirce’s denunciation of “transcendental apothecaries” is 
here interpreted as a rejection of the kind of justificatory transcendental philosophy 
that aims to provide a grounding of knowledge beyond that provided by ordinary 
life and inquiry. Gava maintains that the non-justificatory stance is compatible with 
pragmaticism; but he also suggests that Peirce late turn toward critical common-
sensism amounts to an unfortunate straying from this moderate transcendental path 
toward a justificatory one. 
Gava gives Peirce credit for having reinvented transcendental philosophy 
in a pragmatic context (154). In effect, this means that the Peircean categories of 
firstness, secondness, and thirdness are not “mathematical” starting points; they are 
phenomenological elements prescinded from a semiotic whole, and therefore both 
indeterminate and capable of evolution (155-156). By this “pragmatic” move, Gava in 
effect excludes certain texts in which Peirce at least appears to perform a mathematical 
abstraction or derivation of the basic relational categories; indeed, the connection 
between mathematics and philosophy is not addressed in depth in the book. If the 
categories are grounded in (or factually dependent on) signs in the way Gava suggests, 
with prescision and the other forms of dependency providing the philosophical tools 
needed to perform the analysis, we are then left with the question of the precise function 
of Peircean mathematics in the proceedings. Some other significant issues are also left 
mostly unaddressed, such as the nature of the alleged categoreal indeterminacy. Here, 
it would have been interesting to see a discussion of how this might pan out in terms 
of Peirce’s logic of vagueness. Moreover, it could have been useful to pursue a closer 
comparison between Peirce’s supposed reinvention of the transcendental method with 
more recent accounts of “pragmatised” Kantian philosophy (as e.g. developed by 
Sami Pihlström); but that is perhaps a task for different book.
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As Gava’s exploration into the transcendental depths of Peirce’s thought 
progresses, it becomes gradually clearer that it involves a specific understanding of the 
job of philosophy; philosophical inquiry is, first and foremost, charged with the task 
of disentangling the semiotic structure of our thought and experience, with a special 
emphasis on those cognitive elements that we call “knowledge”. The categories are 
understood as transcendental “conditions” for the semiotic experiences and thought-
practices from which they are prescinded. Consequently, Gava can consistently say 
that the pragmatic factually precedes the phenomenological, while at the same time 
identifying a relation of logical dependence between the abstract categories and more 
concrete semiotic experience. 
Gava may indeed be on to something in his reappraisal of the transcendental element 
in Peirce’s thought. Putting certain pragmatist prejudices against “transcendental 
philosophy” aside, it is arguably possible to identify a “pragmatically transcendental” 
method guiding much of the work that Peirce does in phenomenology and semeiotic. 
With this in mind, it is a bit surprising that Gava does not make more of a quite well-
known passage (CP 2.227) in which Peirce characterises the task of “quasi-necessary” 
semiotic as a process of abstraction leading to fallible statements concerning “what 
must be the characters of all signs used by a ‘scientific’ intelligence”.
While the categories, as accounts of the most basic relational structure of experience 
and thought, are singled out as the central transcendental conceptions in this reading 
of Peirce, Gava also identifies other Kantian elements in Peircean philosophy. Their 
special transcendental status is due to their necessity for the progress of inquiry; Gava 
ranks the esthetic ideal and regulative hopes as such requisites. These are definitely 
regulative principles – invaluable guides that provide no guarantees for success. In 
contrast, Gava considers the categories to be constitutive as well as regulative. Their 
regulative character is revealed by the fact that they do not state anything determinate 
about experience before they receive an a posteriori determination; but they are 
nonetheless constitutive in the sense that they are present in every phenomenon.
These claims are in need of some clarification and specification. It is not self-
evident, for example, to what degree the progress of science requires an esthetic 
ideal of the kind envisaged by Peirce – at least if the ideal is understood as the 
summum bonum. Inquiry can make progress with much more modest means; there 
are arguably cases of scientific advancement that have been driven by much baser 
motives. A stronger case can perhaps be made for the Peircean thesis that a hope for 
the discoverability of the truth is involved in any particular inquiry; but in a sense, 
that is a less ambitious proposition. That is, Gava appears to argue that the process of 
development must be supported by the esthetic ideal; but this may be one step too far 
toward idealism – granted, one that Peirce also may have taken at times. Likewise, 
I find it difficult to get behind Gava’s (160) contention that Peirce’s transcendental 
analysis of the fundamental elements of our representational thinking must come 
before any hypothesis about nature in its independency. Perhaps this is just a bit 
carelessly formulated, but I fail to see what would necessitate such an ordering of 
inquiry – even in a less exacting regulatory sense.
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Fittingly, a substantial portion of Gava’s book is dedicated to the question of the 
ordering of philosophical inquiry. He argues that Peirce’s grand classification of the 
sciences – or at least its philosophical part – is fundamentally grounded in the method 
of prescision. Thus, although Peirce sometimes appeals to the Comtean principle of 
ordering as a leading principle of classification, Gava (21) contends this is not its 
true source. In his terms, the hierarchical organisation of the sciences is logical rather 
than factual. On the other hand, sciences higher up in the ranks are characterised 
as factually dependent on more concrete fields of knowledge. As Gava (20) points 
out, this perspective leaves room for the fact that a discovery in a certain domain of 
inquiry may necessitate a development in a more abstract science on which it logically 
depends. Purportedly, another aspect of factual dependence is manifested by the way 
the lower sciences “furnish cases” for more abstract inquiries. 
Thus, Gava claims to have identified the leading architectonic principles grounding 
Peirce’s classification of scientific inquiry. Of course, Gava is not the first to have 
detected categoreal ideas at play in Peirce’s system of classification, with its tell-tale 
tendency to unfold in groups of three; but by applying his particular interpretation 
of the non-justificatory transcendental method, Gava provides a unique and thought-
provoking – but not fully convincing – account of how things are supposed to hang 
together.
One difficulty, which Gava (22) duly notes, is that the dependencies between the 
sciences – even if restricted to the branches of philosophy – tend to be less rigid than 
those between the basic Peircean categories. The principles laid out by Gava also 
seem to fit certain instances better than others. They provide a reasonable description 
of the relationship between Peircean phenomenology and semeiotic (Peircean logic 
in the broad sense); the signs investigated by semeiotic are logically dependent on 
the phenomenological categories, while phenomenology still relies on signs in order 
to abstract the categories. In other words, the categories are prescindable from sign 
relations, but nonetheless factually dependent on the sign relations of thought and 
experience (27). Conspicuously, Gava struggles with the application of this model to 
the connections between Peirce’s normative sciences. Still, after some hesitation, he 
outlines a tentative explication where self-control is prescindable from representation 
(but not vice versa).
However, the claim that philosophy (in general) would be factually dependent 
on the special empirical sciences (25) may be even more problematic, at least if the 
question concerns its adequacy as a description of Peirce’s position. Although it is 
true that Peirce emphasises that philosophy has much to learn methodologically from 
the “successful sciences” (such as physics and chemistry), it is not clear to me that he 
would be advocating a factual dependency in any substantial sense of the term. Rather, 
he tends to stress that the primary raw material of philosophy is common experience, 
for which no special means and methods of observation and acquisition are needed. 
Perhaps the strongest counter-example (which Gava also mentions on 25) to this 
would be Darwinian evolutionism – or perhaps more generally, evolutionism, which 
undeniably undergirds Peirce’s scientific metaphysics – if not his entire philosophical 
world-view. However, given his explicit emphasis on the relative autonomy of 
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philosophical inquiry, this is perhaps best viewed as secondary support for something 
that is purportedly discoverable without any help from the special sciences. At any 
rate, it does not seem plausible to hold that Peirce’s system would necessarily require 
special empirical studies as “occasions of introduction” of philosophical conceptions; 
and a similar case could be made for mathematics in relation to philosophy. To be fair, 
Gava is careful not to overstate his case; but questions such as these cast at least some 
doubts on his architectonic explication of Peirce’s model of scientific inquiry.
This brings us to another challenge for Gava’s approach, related to some seemingly 
incongruous claims that Peirce makes for his arrangement of the sciences. While 
the hierarchical ordering of inquiries is an evident result of the project, Peirce also 
repeatedly asserts that his classification is not meant to be an imaginary construct of 
disciplines identified on a priori grounds, but of activities that do (or at last could) 
occupy actual inquirers. Here, Gava’s account may be more descriptive of what Peirce 
actually does than of what his programme prescribes; one can at any rate question 
whether such projected lines of inquiry as Peircean phaneroscopy and esthetics fulfil 
the Peircean criteria for a science. Even if it is possible to make a case for remarkable 
prescience in some cases, to aver that there would ever have been a full-blown science 
of esthetics in Peirce’s sense would be dubious. Instead, it seems that esthetics is 
posited at the head of the normative disciplines for systemic reasons. In Peirce’s 
treatment, it tends to evolve into a relatively narrow thesis concerning the summum 
bonum, the singular study of which would arguably be too thin for a “living body” 
of inquirers. This is not to say that a broader view of Peircean esthetics could not be 
developed; but I would argue that Peirce is just more realistic when he concedes that 
the normative sciences are best viewed as three phases of one and the same line of 
inquiry, rather than as sciences in their own right.
In fact, Gava seems to suggest something along these lines in his reassessment 
of the third branch of (semiotic) logic, which Peirce variously called “rhetoric” or 
“methodeutic”. One of the boldest contentions of Gava’s tome is that it is on this level 
of philosophical inquiry that we fully uncover the leading transcendental regulative 
principle of Peirce’s undertaking, namely the purposefulness governing the pursuit 
of new knowledge in inquiry (5). It is comprehended as an orientation toward an end 
involved in a thought process, and thus distinguished from purposiveness understood 
as a conformity to an end (69). According to Gava, it is speculative rhetoric – “the 
general study of the conditions of interpretation in order to reach any kind of purpose” 
(36) that is charged with laying out the principles of this teleology – and arguably, the 
leading rationale of Peirce’s overall philosophical project.
Furthermore, Gava puts forward a novel reconstruction of the relationship 
between speculative rhetoric and methodeutic. The latter is construed as a special case 
of the former; while Peircean rhetoric is concerned with the full range of emotional, 
energetic, and logical interpretants; methodeutic is limited to the study of logical 
interpretation. In other words, methodeutic is a study of the purposeful development 
of knowledge (33), and thereby given pre-eminence as the subdivision of logic that 
best manifests its normative character.
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As Gava (39-40) observes, Peirce’s hierarchical ordering of the sciences might 
lead us to assume that methodeutic does not play central role in development of the 
Peircean philosophical system, as the principles it discovers are applicable only to 
metaphysics and other “lower” sciences. In contrast, Gava (42) boldly argues that 
methodeutic can be applied to more fundamental disciplines. However, its task is not 
one of justification; rather, it is to make heuristic principles already working in our 
unreflective methods of investigation explicit.
Regarding this rather controversial point, I am broadly in agreement with Gava. 
The understanding of the relationship between philosophical inquiries he outlines here 
not only helps us to make sense of the classification of sciences; it also casts some 
new light on the role of leading principles of inquiry in Peirce’s philosophical vision. 
Instances of such “presumptions” noted by Gava include the il lume naturale thesis 
and the assumption that there is a discoverable reality at all. Other prominent examples 
could perhaps be added, e.g. fallibilism and synechism (the latter understood not as a 
metaphysical doctrine, but as “a regulative principle of logic, prescribing what sort of 
hypothesis is fit to be entertained and examined” (CP 6.173).
However, Gava’s contribution to the study of Peirce’s rhetoric is not limited to the 
reassessment of the role of methodeutic for the Peircean system as a whole. For Gava, 
speculative rhetoric is explicitly focused on the study of interpretants, which in his 
reading seems to be equivalent to a philosophical investigation of the transcendental 
conditions of interpretation. Thus, Gava parts way with those commentators who 
have construed Peircean rhetoric as a study of communication, and have argued that 
methodeutic (as a narrower specialisation) could be understood as a study of scientific 
communication. Here, I find my own earlier construal of speculative rhetoric and 
methodeutic on the firing line, and not without reason. Gava puts forward a careful 
reading of Peirce’s “Ideas, Stray or Stolen, about Scientific Writing”, and quite 
convincingly argues that the listing of rhetorical studies sketched at the end of this 
article should not be understood as a classification of philosophical rhetoric, but rather 
as an outline of the need to develop different rhetoric for different, more concrete, 
fields of interpretation.
Still, other aspects of Gava’s reconstruction are not equally satisfying. For one thing, 
he seems to operate with a rather narrow traditional conception of communication, 
namely that of one individual conveying something to another. However, Peirce’s 
characterisation of “internal” thought in terms of communication between selves puts 
an interesting twist on this story. Arguably, communication is not as supplementary in 
relation to interpretation as Gava seems to suggest; and given his idealistic emphasis 
on thought, Peirce’s dialogical view of mind renders any strict distinction between the 
two questionable.
Understanding speculative rhetoric strictly as a study of interpretation may exclude 
more from the purview of Peircean philosophy than one would like. True, Gava can 
find a lot of support for his reading in Peirce’s definitions of rhetoric, which often 
place the emphasis squarely on the interpretant pole of the sign relation. However, 
if taken too literally, this leaves a curious gap in the account: it has no place for the 
study of utterance. I would argue that Peirce’s explication of assertion needs to be 
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considered here. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to maintain that the function of 
methodeutic is not restricted to right interpretation; a substantial part of its normative 
force relates to questions of the requirements of apposite scientific utterance. The 
community depends on it; thought is not strictly, perhaps not even predominantly, 
individual.
Consequently, I tend to favour Gava’s more general characterisation of methodeutic 
as “a scientific study of the principles that guide the effective use of signs in processes 
of investigation” (61); and I would argue that it would be more productive to construe 
speculative rhetoric as a philosophical study of sign use rather than as interpretation 
merely. Analogously, I find Gava’s (75) contention that the normative sciences do not 
provide any prescriptions but only describe the fundamental purposeful character of 
thought, will, and feeling too restricting. Are not regulative methodeutic principles 
highly prescriptive, indicating what to do and not to do in inquiry, albeit on a highly 
general level? It may be true that Peirce’s emphasis on the theoretical character of 
the normative sciences entails that they are primarily descriptive; but surely it is a 
description undertaken in order to facilitate the improvement of our habits – or, to 
put the matter in more elevated terms, to contribute to the development of concrete 
reasonableness. This is a discussion that needs to be pursued; and I am gratified 
that Gava has provided us with new means and incentives to push it forward. 
His re-examination of the transcendental element in Peirce’s philosophy and the 
accompanying reassessment of the function of speculative rhetoric – Peirce’s “highest 
and most living branch of logic” (CP 2.333) – deserve to be widely read, intensely 
debated, and carefully criticised in Peirce scholarship.
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